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INTERPRETING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: Is THERE
DISSENSION AMONG THE RANKS?
Lilly v. Virginia
119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999)
Kimberly G. Gore
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him has ancient roots.
The Hebrews recognized the right of the accused to hear testimony given against
him.' The Romans also allowed the accused to confront witnesses in person
before conviction and sentencing Likewise, early English courts also recog-
nized confrontation rights by allowing written questions to be given to
witnesses.'
The development of the confrontation doctrine in England faltered throughout
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." Some courts refused to allow con-
frontation rights to the accused.' Other courts only allowed the accused to con-
front witnesses in felony cases.' Often, politics interfered with procedure, and
the right to confrontation was discarded in many treason cases.7
In America, the right to confrontation developed quickly because of the adver-
sarial approach to criminal procedure adopted by the colonies.' Also, as England
attempted to regulate the colonies and the American Revolution approached, the
right to confront accusers became more crucial; the colonists wanted desperately
to avoid the abuses that were occurring in sixteenth century England.' The
Framers emphasized the confrontation right by placing it within the Bill of
Rights, establishing the confrontation right as a constitutional protection."
Under the Sixth Amendment, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to... be confronted with the witnesses against him.""
Although the Confrontation Clause is a constitutional right and not an evidentiary
standard, it often intertwines with the hearsay doctrine. Both the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay doctrine "stem from the same roots"' 2 and "protect similar
values." 3 The main purpose of the Confrontation Clause is "to ensure the reliability of
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing [cross-exam-
ination] in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."' 4
1. Amicus Br., 1998 WL 901782 at *4 (1998).
2. Id. at "5.
3. Id
4. Id at *5-8.
5. Id at *7.
6. Id
7. Id. The Crown often used criminal law procedures to control its adversaries. The treason cases in Stuart
and Tudor England are good examples of how the right to confrontation was disregarded. Id.
8. Id. at *10.
9. ld. at *10-11.
10. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
11. Id.
12. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
13. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
14. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
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Similarly, the hearsay doctrine excludes out-of-court statements because they are
presumptively unreliable and cannot be tested by cross-examination, "the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."1 With time, though, courts
and legislatures have carved out many exceptions to the hearsay rule. Where the reli-
ability of hearsay statements is sufficient and will not increase with cross-examina-
tion, hearsay statements are admissible.
This similarity of purpose has resulted in a weaving together of the two doc-
trines. The Confrontation Clause requires a higher standard of reliability;
hearsay statements may fall within a hearsay exception yet still violate the
Confrontation Clause. In Mattox v. United States,6 the Supreme Court first held
that certain types of hearsay statements were compatible with the Confrontation
Clause. Since the decision in Mattox, courts have increased the range of hearsay
statements that meet Confrontation Clause standards, changing Confrontation
Clause analysis into more of a hearsay reliability test than a constitutional safe-
guard. The Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts," in particular, opened
the door to a hearsay analysis for Confrontation Clause issues.
Now it appears that the pendulum may be swinging in the opposite direction,
moving away from a hearsay reliability test and back to a constitutional safeguard
analysis. Lilly v. Virginia 8 highlighted the split in the Supreme Court's
Confrontation Clause analysis. In Lilly, the Court unanimously agreed that
admission of an accomplice's confession against the defendant violated the defen-
dant's Confrontation Clause rights. 9 The plurality opinion adhered strongly to
the Ohio v. Roberts test, but three of the four concurring opinions strongly sug-
gested that a hearsay analysis could not effectively solve Confrontation Clause
issues.
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT - INTERPRETING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Because both doctrines rely heavily on cross-examination, the United States
Supreme Court must regularly define the parameters of the Confrontation Clause as it
relates to the hearsay doctrine. Hearsay evidence may fall within an exception yet still
be excluded under the Confrontation Clause, because the accused is denied the right to
cross-examine the declarant. In these situations, the courts must decide whether the
hearsay evidence is reliable enough to satisfy the heightened standard of the
Confrontation Clause. The following cases demonstrate that the Confrontation Clause
is not absolute-it has been expanded and contracted by the Supreme Court over the
years to accommodate the various interpretations adopted by the members of the Court.
1. Mattox v. United States 20
Mattox was charged with and convicted of murder.21 On appeal, the conviction
15. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
16. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
17. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
18. 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999).
19. Id. at 1901.
20. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
21. Id.
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was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.2" Before the new trial,
two of the most important prosecutorial witnesses died. 3 These two witnesses
had testified at the first trial and were subjected to both direct examination and
cross-examination." At the second trial, the testimony of these two witnesses
was read into the record from the first trial transcript over the defendant's objec-
tions.25 The defendant was convicted again of murder.25 Mattox also appealed
the second conviction, claiming that admission of the deceased witnesses' testi-
mony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.27
The United States Supreme Court upheld the admission of the testimony of the
two deceased witnesses.28 Justice Brown, writing for the Court, first stated that
all states regularly admitted the former testimony of deceased witnesses as evi-
dence. 9 Justice Brown also stated that over a dozen state supreme courts had
examined whether admission of former testimony of deceased witnesses violated
the Confrontation Clause." Those courts unanimously admitted the former testi-
mony, holding that "the right of cross-examination having once been exercised,
it was no hardship upon the defendant to allow the testimony of the deceased
witness to be read."31 The Supreme Court agreed. 2
The Confrontation Clause's primary objective, according to Justice Brown,
was to prevent ex parte affidavits or depositions from being admitted in lieu of
live testimony.3 Live testimony, particularly cross-examination, served several
purposes: 1) to test the recollection of a witness, 2) to "sift[] the conscience" of
a witness, and 3) to give the jury an opportunity to test the witness' credibility by
observing his demeanor.3 For these reasons, live testimony is preferable to all
out-of-court statements. However,
general rules of law of this kind,... must occasionally give way to considera-
tions of public policy and the necessities of the case. To say that a criminal,
after having once been convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should
go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would
be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent.3
The Confrontation Clause, according to Justice Brown, was not absolute. 6 The
substance of the Confrontation Clause had been preserved because Mattox had
previously cross-examined the witnesses under oath.37 Nothing in the wording of
22. Id.
23. Id. at 240.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 238.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 250.
29. Id. at 240-41.
30. Id. at 242.
31. Id
32. Id. at 244.
33. Id. at 242.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 243.
36. Id. at 244.
37. Id.
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the Confrontation Clause granted Mattox the right of repeated cross-examination.'
The former testimony, therefore, satisfied the Confrontation Clause; Mattox's con-
stitutional rights were not violated by admission of the former testimony.
39
Justice Brown, in his opinion, never mentioned that the testimony of the two
deceased witnesses was hearsay evidence. However, the admission of former
testimony of deceased witnesses is now a codified hearsay exception.4" Mattox v.
United States, therefore, was the first Supreme Court case to admit hearsay evi-
dence against a claim under the Confrontation Clause. The next significant
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was set forth in Douglas v. Alabama."1
2. Douglas v. Alabama42
Douglas was on trial for assault with intent to murder."3 His accomplice, Loyd,
had already been tried separately and convicted." At Douglas' trial, the
Solicitor called Loyd to the stand; Loyd invoked his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination and refused to answer any questions." The prosecutor
was allowed to treat Loyd as a hostile witness. 7 Over defense objections, the
Solicitor read a copy of Loyd's confession, implicating Douglas as the shooter,
into the record as a means of refreshing Loyd's memory.48 Loyd persisted in
invoking his right against self-incrimination and never responded to the prosecu-
tor's questions. 9 Likewise, Loyd refused to respond to any questions from
Douglas' attorney."0 Three law enforcement officers then testified that the con-
fession read into the record was made and signed by Loyd."1
The jury found Douglas guilty of assault with intent to murder.5 2 On appeal,
Douglas argued that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated
because he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Loyd about the confes-
sion. 3 The Court of Appeals of Alabama agreed."' The court held that the con-
fession was inadmissible because Loyd was not cross-examined and noted that
the Solicitor's reading the confession into the record "might have been an indi-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Federal Rule of Evidence 804 creates a hearsay exception for unavailable witnesses in a two-part test.
Under FRE 804(a)(4), a deceased person is unavailable as a witness. Once a witness is declared unavailable,
certain statements are considered hearsay exceptions. Former testimony is one of those exceptions. FRE
804(b)(1).
41. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 416.
44. Id.
45. "Solicitor" is Alabama's term for a prosecutor.
46. Id. Loyd was planning to appeal his conviction, so his lawyer advised him to invoke his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
47. Id. When the court grants permission to treat a witness as hostile, the examiner is allowed to treat the
witness as if he was under cross-examination. For further explanation, see Federal Rule of Evidence 611.
48. Id. Because Loyd was treated as a hostile witness, the prosecution was able to enter his confession in the
record by reading a few sentences at a time and then asking the question, "Did you make that statement?" id.
The confession inculpated Douglas. For an explanation of this technique, see Federal Rule of Evidence 612.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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rect mode of getting the inadmissible confession in evidence.""5 The appellate
court upheld the conviction, however, because although Douglas' attorney ini-
tially objected to the reading of Loyd's confession, he did not object after each
question during the reading. 6 Failure to object, the court held, constituted a
waiver.
5 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 8 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, reasoned that
[a]lthough the Solicitor's reading of Loyd's alleged statement, and Loyd's
refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may
well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact
made the statement; and Loyd's reliance upon the privilege created a situation
in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made
and that it was true. 59
Justice Brennan further stated that Douglas' right to cross-examination had been
violated on several levels.6" First, the Solicitor, by reading the confession into
the record, created an inference that Loyd made the statement.6 ' This inference
could not be tested by cross-examination because the Solicitor was not a
witness. 2 Second, Loyd could not be cross-examined because he invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, leaving both the inference
that he made the statement and the truth of that statement untested by cross-
examination.63 Finally, the cross-examination of the three law enforcement offi-
cers who authenticated Loyd's confession was inadequate to compensate for
Douglas' inability to cross-examine both the Solicitor and Loyd.64
Justice Brennan viewed the reading of the confession into the record as a
means to refresh Loyd's memory as the equivalent of testimony.65 Therefore, the
only way to have avoided a Confrontation Clause violation in reading the con-
fession was for Douglas to have an opportunity to cross-examine Loyd.6 Loyd's
refusal to answer "added critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not
subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant.
6 7
Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment." In separate
opinions, they held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process,
rather than the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, was violated because




58. Id. at 423.








67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 423.
69. Id.
2001]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ring opinions in Pointer v. Texas,7" where they stated that the Sixth Amendment
was inapplicable to the States, but that the right of an accused to confront wit-
nesses was fundamental to the concept of a fair trial. 1
Douglas v. Alabama first applied the Sixth Amendment to the States. In apply-
ing the Sixth Amendment, the Court refused to allow an accomplice's confession
to be used against the defendant without providing the defendant an opportunity
to cross-examine the accomplice in court.
As in Mattox, the Court in Douglas makes no mention of hearsay. The hearsay
at issue in Douglas is particularly notable because it was an accomplice's confes-
sion that inculpated a defendant, the same type of hearsay statement at issue in
Lilly v. Virginia. The Court found Loyd's custodial confession unreliable
because the confession was the only direct evidence linking Douglas to the mur-
der. Because it was unreliable and Douglas was denied an opportunity to cross-
examine Loyd, admission of the confession violated the Confrontation Clause.
3. Bruton v. United States72
The defendant and his accomplice, Evans, were convicted in a joint trial of
armed postal robbery.73 Evans confessed twice to a postal inspector; in the first
confession, Evans named Bruton, but in the second confession, he only admitted
to having an unnamed accomplice. 4 These confessions were admitted into evi-
dence, with a limiting jury instruction that the confessions could only be used
against Bruton."
Both Evans and Bruton appealed their convictions." The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed Evans' conviction because his oral confessions
should not have been entered against him." The court affirmed Bruton's convic-
tion, however, because the jury instruction to disregard Evans' confession was
properly given.78
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed Bruton's con-
viction.79 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,8" compared Bruton's case with
the circumstances of Douglas v. Alabama. 1 In Douglas, the lack of opportunity
to cross-examine an accomplice about the accomplice's confession violated the
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.2 The confession was not admitted as
evidence, but the prosecutor read it into the record. 3
70. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Pointer v. Texas was decided on the same day as Douglas v. Alabama.
71. Id. at 408-409.
72. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
73. Id. at 124.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 125. The instruction was given in accordance with Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232
(1957). Delli Paoli held that clear instructions to disregard a confessor's extrajudicial statement that the code-
fendant participated in the crime satisfied the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 126.
76. Id. at 124.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 125.
79. Id. at 125-26.
80. Id. at 123.
81. Id. at 126-28.
82. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 416 (1965).
83. Id.
[VOL. 21:83
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The ruling in Douglas, Justice Brennan reasoned, provided stronger motivation
to reverse Bruton's conviction.84 In Bruton's case, Evans' accomplice confession
was actually admitted into evidence.8" Evans did not take the stand, so Bruton
had no opportunity to cross-examine him about the confessions.86 Bruton, therefore,
was denied his rights under the Confrontation Clause.' The limiting instruction
could not substitute for the constitutionally guaranteed right to confrontation, even
when considering public policy concerns, such as the efficiency of joint trials."
Justice White dissented.89 According to Justice White, the confessions were
hearsay evidence, inadmissible against Bruton.9" As hearsay evidence, it carried
the usual hearsay "dangers of inaccuracy."91 Additionally, though, "the [arrest]
statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with special suspi-
cion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate
himself, a codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are less
credible than ordinary hearsay evidence."92
Despite these concerns, White was concerned that the majority opinion laid
down a rigid and unworkable rule.93 After balancing the Confrontation Clause
with policy considerations, he determined that the limiting instruction was suffi-
cient.9" Without evidence that the jury had relied on Evans' confession in con-
victing Bruton, any error was harmless.9
The effect of the new rule on joint trials also concerned Justice White.98 Joint
trials promote judicial economy and efficiency. 7 The majority ruling, White
feared, would burden the judicial system with either the time and cost of separate
trials or the necessity of obtaining a ruling of harmless error before admitting an
accomplice's confession in a joint trial.98
Bruton reemphasized the importance of the Confrontation Clause in criminal
trials and expanded its reading of the Confrontation Clause. The Court had
always maintained that the Confrontation Clause did not exclude all hearsay.
Bruton ruled, however, that a limiting jury instruction is not a sufficient substitute
when an accomplice's hearsay statements are admitted into evidence. The majori-
ty rule implied that adequate substitutes for cross-examination exist, but it did not
attempt to define any cross-examination substitutes. Again, the type of hearsay
statement at issue was an accomplice statement that inculpated the defendant.
84. Id.
85. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127.
86. Id. at 128.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 137.
89. Id. at 138.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 141.
92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 139.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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4. Ohio v. Roberts99
Police arrested Roberts and charged him with forgery and receiving stolen
property.00 Specifically, he was charged with forging a check in Bernard Isaac's
name and with possession of Isaac's stolen credit cards.0 1 At the preliminary
hearing, the defense called the daughter of the victim, Anita, to testify.' 2 She
admitted that she knew the defendant and that she had given him permission to
use her apartment while she was out of town. 3 Despite leading questions and a
lengthy examination, however, she denied that she had given the defendant the
checks and credit cards.104
Before the trial, Anita was subpoenaed to appear.05 When Anita failed to appear
at the trial, the prosecution offered the transcript of her preliminary hearing testi-
mony.10 The defense objected.'0 7 During the voir dire hearing to determine the
admissibility of the transcript, Anita's mother testified that she had no way to reach
Anita."0 On the basis of this testimony, the trial court ruled that Anita was unavail-
able as a witness and admitted her preliminary hearing testimony into evidence."0
The defendant appealed the admission of Anita's testimony on Confrontation
Clause grounds. 0 The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, holding that the pros-
ecution failed to make a good faith effort to bring Anita to the trial. 1 The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court, holding that "the mere
opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing did not afford constitu-
tional confrontation for purposes of trial."' 1 2 The supreme court reasoned that
there was "little incentive to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing,
where the 'ultimate issue' is only probable cause ... ."113
The Supreme Court granted certiorari1  and reversed.1  Justice Blackmun deliv-
ered the Court's opinion. 16 After reviewing prior Confrontation Clause cases,
Justice Blackmun noted that the Court had repeatedly rejected a literal reading of
the Confrontation Clause, which would exclude all hearsay statements. 7 The
99. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).





105. Id. at 59.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 59-60. In the year between the preliminary hearing and the trial, Anita left for Tucson, Arizona.
Id. The Isaacs had heard from Anita twice, once through a welfare social worker in San Francisco, and again
from somewhere "outside Ohio." Id. To the Isaacs' knowledge, Anita had not contacted anyone else. Id.
109. Id. at 60.
110. Id. at 59.
111. Id. at 60.
112. Id. at 61.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 62.
115. Id. at 76.
116. Id at 58.
117. Id. at 63. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), specifically rejected a literal reading by admit-
ting the prior testimony of deceased witnesses. Id.
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Court recognized, however, that the Confrontation Clause did intend the exclusion
of some hearsay statements. 18 Deciding when to exclude hearsay statements on
Confrontation Clause grounds required balancing the utility and necessity of
cross-examination in upholding the "'integrity of the fact-finding process' with
public policy concerns and the "'necessities of the case."" 19 Although the Court
was unwilling to "'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would deter-
mine the validity of all . . . hearsay 'exceptions," '120 the Court was willing to
map out a "general approach to the problem.'
21
The Court developed a two-part test to examine the admissibility of hearsay
within the confines of the Confrontation Clause. First, as a threshold determina-
tion, the witness must be unavailable to testify.122 Justice Blackmun did not
define the meaning of unavailable; he did, however, place the burden on the
prosecution to "either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, [sic] the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.' ' 23 Although
Blackmun stated that the Sixth Amendment required unavailability, he also noted
that it had not been required in Dutton v. Evans.'24
Once the court has determined that a witness is unavailable for cross-examina-
tion, the Confrontation Clause requires that the hearsay evidence be excluded
unless 1) "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or 2) the
evidence has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' ' 2 Justice Blackmun
again emphasized the necessity of accuracy in fact-finding as the basis for this
two-prong "' indicia of reliability' test.1
26
Applying this approach, the Court determined first, that Anita was unavailable
for cross-examination at trial. 27 The court held secondly, that her preliminary
hearing testimony had "sufficient 'indicia of reliability" 1" 28 because it was "test-
ed.... with the equivalent of significant cross-examination," both in form and in
substance.' 29 Although Anita was called as a defense witness, defense counsel
used leading questions and repeatedly tested Anita's veracity, perception, and
memory through her examination. 3 '
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.' In the dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Brennan agreed with the test applied in the majority opinion, but dis-
agreed with the majority opinion's finding that Anita was unavailable.
32
Brennan emphasized the heavy burden placed on the prosecution to make a dili-
gent, good-faith effort to locate the witness and bring them to the trial to testi-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 64-5.




125. Id. at 66.
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 73,
128. Id. (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 70.
130. Id. at 70-1.
131. Id. at 77.
132. Id. at 79.
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fy.'33 He concluded that the State had failed to meet this burden.1 3 4
Ohio v. Roberts solidified the Court's interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause by creating the two-part test. The Court emphatically refused to adopt a
strict reading of the Confrontation Clause that would exclude all hearsay state-
ments. 35 Roberts, however, did more than provide a guideline for lower courts
to apply; the Court expanded admissibility of hearsay statements under the
Confrontation Clause. Before Roberts, the Court had recognized only a few
types of exceptions as complying with the Confrontation Clause: prior testimo-
ny of deceased witnesses,136 prior testimony of otherwise unavailable witness-
es,137 and coconspirator statements.'38
With the adoption of the Roberts test, any hearsay statement falling within a
firmly rooted exception or having particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
complied with the constitutional guarantee of the Confrontation Clause. The
Court did not define which hearsay exceptions are firmly rooted, other than to
state that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that
admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of
the constitutional protection." 39 Additionally, some hearsay statements outside
firmly rooted exceptions could now be admitted without violating the
Confrontation Clause so long as they carried adequate indicia of reliability. The
Court also failed to define indicia of reliability. Roberts adopted a hearsay-based
approach to Confrontation Clause issues. Since Roberts, the Court has explained
proper application of the two-part test through the following cases.
5. Lee v. Illinois1
40
The defendant and her boyfriend, Thomas, were charged with the double mur-
der of Lee's aunt and the aunt's friend, Harris.'41 Each gave a confession to the
police.1 42 Lee's confession indicated that the killings were sudden, provoked by
the two victims. 43 According to Lee, Thomas killed Harris, and Lee killed her
aunt after a struggle over a knife. 4 Thomas' account, however, described a pre-
meditated plan to kill Lee's aunt.4 According to Thomas, Harris just happened
to be visiting when the opportunity to carry out the plan arose.
14
The two defendants were tried together in a bench trial.147 Counsel for both
sides and the judge agreed that the judge would consider each defendant's con-
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 66, n. 9.
136. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
137. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
138. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
139. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
140. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
141. Id. at 532.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 533-34.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 534-35.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 536.
[VOL. 21:83
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fession as evidence against the confessor only." In closing arguments, Lee's
attorney argued that Lee had nothing to do with Harris' murder and that Lee
killed her aunt either in self-defense or in the heat of passion. 49 In rebuttal, the
prosecution referred to Thomas' confession, pointing out that there was a plan to
kill Lee's aunt and that Lee assisted in Harris' murder."'
The judge found Lee guilty of both murders."5 ' In his order, the judge
"expressly relied on Thomas' confession and his version of the killings ....
Lee's contentions [of self-defense and heat of passion].. . were 'disputed by the
statement of her co-defendant ... ""'2 The state appellate court upheld the con-
victions,"5 3 holding that although the trial court considered Thomas' confession in
determining Lee's guilt, the two confessions were "'interlocking' and did not
"fall within the rule of Bruton v. United States,... that the 'admission of a code-
fendant's extrajudicial statement that inculpates the other defendant violates the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him."' 154
The Supreme Court reversed Lee's conviction,"5 applying the two-part test set
forth in Ohio v. Roberts.5 Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion.
15 7
First, Justice Brennan determined that under either Douglas v. Alabama"5 8 or
Bruton v. United States, 9 Thomas confession failed to fall under a firmly rooted
hearsay exception."0 Bruton specifically held that codefendant confessions vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause.161 Without the right to cross-examine the codefen-
dant, the confession cannot be entered into evidence. 2 Although Bruton applied
to Lee's case, Brennan reasoned that Douglas provided a closer parallel."
In Douglas, as in Lee's case, the State attempted to use an accomplice's con-
fession as evidence. 4 Reading the confession into the record violated Douglas'
Confrontation Clause rights.165 In Douglas, however, the confession was not
technically evidence; there was just a fear that the jury had considered reading
the confession as a writing to refresh the witness' memory as evidence against
the defendant.'
Thomas' statement, however, was used as evidence; the judge relied upon it to
convict Lee.67 "In this case, the Court d[id] not address a hypothetical. The danger
against which the Confrontation Clause was erected-the conviction of a defendant
148. Id.
149. Id. at 536-37.
150. Id. at 537.
151. Id. at 538.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 538-39.
155. Id. at 547.
156. 448 U.S. 56, 66(1980).
157. Lee, 476 U.S. at 531.
158. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
159. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
160. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541-42.
161. 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968).
162. Id.
163. Lee, 476 U.S. at 542.
164. 391 U.S. at 127.
165. 476 U.S. at 542-43.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 538.
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based, at least in part, on presumptively unreliable evidence-actually occurred."' '
Having determined that codefendant confessions do not fall within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, Justice Brennan also determined that Thomas' confes-
sion did not have particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 9 Codefendant
confessions bear a presumption of unreliability.70 Thomas' confession did not
overcome that presumption, despite its voluntary nature and common threads
with Lee's confession.
171
Justice Blackmun dissented; the Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice
Rehnquist joined him.172 Blackmun agreed that Ohio v. Roberts provided the
proper test to
ensure that an out-of-court statement is admitted only when it does not threaten
the central mission of the Confrontation Clause, which is 'to advance a practical
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by
assuring that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement.' 1
73
In Lee's case, the Confrontation Clause was not violated.17  Both parts of the
Roberts test were satisfied. 7
First, Thomas' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination rendered him
unavailable as a witness. 7 According to Justice Blackmun, this finding satisfied
both the Roberts Confrontation Clause requirement of unavailability and the
hearsay principle codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1). 177 Second,
Thomas' confession bore sufficient indicia of reliability. 78 Thomas' confession
was "thoroughly and unambiguously adverse to his penal interest.' 1 79 Such
statements fall within a firmly established hearsay exception, based upon the rea-
soning that "a statement asserting a fact distinctly against one's interest is unlike-
ly to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect."'90 Blackmun noted that the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay analyses were separate, but the hearsay analy-
sis did weigh heavily in constitutional determinations under the Confrontation
Clause.' 8' A reliable hearsay statement, therefore, was entitled to a presumption
of reliability under the Confrontation Clause.'82
In Lee's case, Thomas' statement was both an accomplice confession and a
168. Id. at 543.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 544-46.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 547.
173. Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 549-50.
177. Id. at 550-51.
178. ld. at 551.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 551 (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 552.
182. Id.
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statement against his penal interest. Blackmun reasoned that although codefen-
dant confessions are customarily presumed unreliable, they had never been held
per se inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.183 The Court had previously
dealt with codefendant confessions that were not against the confessor's penal
interest.184 Thomas' statement, however, was entirely against his penal interest.18
In no way did it minimize his involvement in the crime or shift blame to Lee;
rather, it was more against his own interests that Lee's confession was against
her interests.'88
Thomas' statements bore two other indicia of reliability. First, Lee's own con-
fession corroborated Thomas' statements.187 Second, the physical evidence cor-
roborated Thomas' confession." The weapons and the tools used to dispose of
the bodies were found based upon both Thomas' and Lee's confessions.189
Additionally, the autopsy results were consistent with the confessions. 9 '
Blackmun concluded that these indicia of reliability satisfied the Roberts test; the
confession fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and bore independent
indicia of reliability.
1 91
Lee v. Illinois held firmly to the rule set forth in Bruton v. United States that
codefendant confessions violate the Confrontation Clause. The Court further
clarified that even similar confessions could not be deemed reliable; any discrep-
ancies between the two confessions created a need for cross-examination.
92
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, agreed that accomplice confessions raise great
concerns, but he emphasized a practical, realistic approach.193 Rather than a per
se inadmissible rule concerning accomplice confessions, he suggested focusing
on the individual facts of each case.194
Two interpretations of the Confrontation Clause emerged from Lee v. Illinois.
The five justices joining in the majority opinion adopted a per se inadmissibility
standard for hearsay exceptions under the Confrontation Clause.19 The majority
held that accomplice confessions violated the Confrontation Clause. 98 Accomplice
confessions violated the Sixth Amendment in both Douglas v. Alabama and Bruton
v. United States; Lee simply followed the rule established by precedent.
The four dissenting justices, however, preferred a common-sense approach to
Confrontation Clause issues.197 Case-by-case adjudication, they reasoned, would
result in better decisions, even though a per se rule would create uniformity, eas-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 553.
185. Id. at 551.
186. Id. at 553.
187. Id. at 555.
188. Id. at 556.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 557.
192. Id. at 546.
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ing the burden on the lower courts to make Confrontation Clause rulings.19 Lee
v. Illinois presented an interesting comparison of the two lines of argument with-
in the Supreme Court, but the 5-4 decision indicated a move toward a more con-
trolled reading of the Confrontation Clause. Idaho v. Wright199 continued that
move toward a closer reading of the Confrontation Clause.
6. Idaho v. Wright"'
Defendant Wright divorced her husband.0 1 As part of an informal agreement,
the couple agreed that their oldest child would spend six months with each par-
ent.2"2 During the child's stay with her father, Wright's daughter, then five years
old, told her father that Wright's boyfriend, Giles, was sexually abusing her.203
The next day, a doctor examined the five-year-old; the doctor found evidence of
sexual abuse. 0" The defendant's younger daughter, then two-and-a-half years
old, was taken into protective custody and examined by a doctor.0 During the
examination, the younger daughter admitted that Giles had touched her inappro-
priately.0 6 She also stated that her older sister was subjected to the abuse more
often.20 7
Soon afterward, the state filed charges against both Wright and her boyfriend,
Giles.108 At the trial, the statements that the younger daughter made to the doctor
during his examination were admitted as evidence under the state's residual
hearsay exception.2 9 The doctor testified that she admitted to being touched by
her father, Giles.21° He also testified that she volunteered a statement that Giles
abused the older daughter more often.
211
The jury convicted both defendants of all counts and sentenced them to twenty
years in prison.2 12 Wright appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction, holding that admission of the doctor's testimony under
198. Id.
199. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
200. Id.





206. Id. at 811.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 810-12. At the trial, both parties and the court agreed that the younger daughter, then three years
old, was unable to testify because she "was 'not capable of communicating to the jury."' Id. at 809. The
Supreme Court decided (without ruling on the issue of whether an allegedly abused child who does not testify
is unavailable) that the younger daughter was unavailable for purposes of analyzing the hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 816. The residual hearsay exception provides that '"[a] statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence."' Id. at 812.
210. Id. at 811.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 812.
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the residual hearsay exception violated the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause.213 The Supreme Court affirmed.214
Justice O'Connor delivered the Court's opinion."' She reiterated the Court's
test for analyzing hearsay statements under the Confrontation Clause, the Ohio v.
Roberts test.216 Roberts requires that for a hearsay exception to be compatible
with Confrontation Clause requirements, the evidence must 1) "fall[] within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception" or 2) have "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness."2 7 For a hearsay exception to be firmly rooted, it must "possess 'the
imprimatur of judicial and legislative experience .. .. ""'28 "Admission under a
firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliabili-
ty because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience
in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements." '219
Residual hearsay exceptions, by definition, do not fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception.22 Justice O'Connor states that these exceptions "accommo-
date[] ad hoc instances in which statements not otherwise falling within a firmly
recognized hearsay exception might nevertheless be sufficiently reliable to be
admissible at trial."22' Recognizing the residual hearsay exception as firmly
rooted would render all -hearsay exceptions firmly rooted, and all hearsay state-
ments would pass the constitutional requirement of the Confrontation Clause.222
The Court, Justice O'Connor emphasized, refused to take that step.223
If a hearsay exception is not firmly rooted, it may still be admissible within the
confines of the Confrontation Clause if it has "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness." '224 The Supreme Court agreed with the Idaho Supreme Court that
the younger daughter's statements to the doctor lacked guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.22 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Idaho Supreme Court's
reliance on procedural safeguards.
2 26
Instead, Justice O'Connor reasoned, finding guarantees of trustworthiness
depended upon the "totality of the circumstances" in each case.227 The relevant
circumstances "include only those that surround the making of the statement and
that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. ' 28 The Court rejected
both procedural safeguards and corroborating evidence as circumstances worthy
of consideration under the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness test.
229
Instead, Justice O'Connor stated, courts should inquire whether "the declarant's
213. Id.
214. Id at 813.
215. Id. at 808.
216. Id. at 814-15.
217. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,66 (1980).





223. Id. at 817-18.
224. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
225. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818.
226. Id.
227. ld. at 819.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 818-19, 823.
2001]
98 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 21:83
truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-
examination would be of marginal utility...."23 '
Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun
dissented.23 Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority erred in dismissing corrob-
orating evidence as an indicator of a hearsay statement's trustworthiness.232 Such
an approach, Kennedy stated, violated the Court's own precedent, particularly
Lee v. Illinois.233 Relying on corroborating evidence was a common sense
approach to analyzing the trustworthiness of a statement and was certainly a fac-
tor for juries to consider.23 In the present case, the younger daughter's state-
ments were substantially corroborated.23 Justice Kennedy recommended that
the judgment be vacated and that the case be remanded for consideration of guar-
antees of trustworthiness.236
Idaho v. Wright appeared to emphasize a common sense, factual approach to
the Roberts test, but the Court also appeared to read the Confrontation Clause
more expansively. A "totality of the circumstances" test certainly provided lower
courts with greater discretion in evaluating hearsay statements under the
Confrontation Clause. Excluding corroborating evidence as a circumstance to
consider, however, heightened the constitutional standard. A hearsay statement
must meet the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness on its own. Overall,
however, the Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright continued the trend of a more
controlled reading of the Confrontation Clause.
Interestingly, neither the majority nor dissenting opinions discussed the possi-
bility of classifying the younger daughter's statements under the medical diagno-
sis hearsay exception. The Court simply accepted the lower court's ruling that
the statement fell under the residual hearsay exception. Regardless of how the
statement was categorized at trial, as a statement for the purpose of medical diag-
nosis, the statement carried particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The
Court explicitly adopted this type of statement in its next Confrontation Clause
case, White v. Illinois.237
7. White v. Illinois
238
The defendant, White, was charged and convicted of aggravated criminal sexu-
al assault, residential burglary, and unlawful restraint. 239 A babysitter testified
that he saw the defendant leaving the room of the four-year-old victim. 240 When
the babysitter questioned the child, she stated that the defendant had choked and
230. Id. at 820.
231. Id. at 827.
232. Id. at 828.
233. Id. at 831.
234. Id. at 828.
235. Id. at 834.
236. Id. at 834-35.
237. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 349.
240. Id.
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threatened her and then sexually assaulted her.241 The child's mother, a police
officer, an emergency room nurse, and a physician subsequently questioned the
child and she told them the same story she had related to the babysitter.22 At
trial, the victim tried unsuccessfully to testify.243 She approached the witness
stand twice, but she became too emotional to testify.2"4 The babysitter, the
child's mother, the police officer, the nurse, and the doctor then took the stand
and testified to the victim's statements.45
The defendant appealed the conviction, claiming his Confrontation Clause rights
were violated because he could not confront the victim.2 6 The Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed the conviction.247 After the Illinois Supreme Court refused to hear
the appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and the Supreme Court affirmed.2"
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion of the Court.249 He reem-
phasized that the Roberts test was the Court's method for determining the admis-
sibility of hearsay statements under the Confrontation Clause. 2"0  Rehnquist
explained, though, that the scope of the Roberts test had changed."' In Roberts,
the Court "used language that might suggest that the Confrontation Clause gen-
erally requires that a declarant ... be found unavailable before his out-of-court
statement may be admitted into evidence.1 2 2 The scope of Roberts was later
clarified by United States v. Inadi,2"3 a Confrontation Clause challenge concern-
ing the admissibility of coconspirator statements made during the course of the
conspiracy. 2 4 In Inadi, the Court concluded that "Roberts stands for the proposi-
tion that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause
inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the
course of a prior judicial proceeding." '255 The Court based its decision on two
principles. First, "coconspirator statements 'provide evidence of the conspira-
cy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same
matters in court. '26 Live testimony "is a poor substitute for the full evidentiary
significance that flows from statements made when the conspiracy is operating
in full force."2 7 Second, Rehnquist reasoned that the unavailability rule did not
affect the admission of coconspirator statements.55 Requiring the prosecution to
prove a witness unavailable simply imposed a burden on the State; many state-
241. Id.
242. Id. at 349-50.
243. Id. at 350.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 351.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 358.
249. Id. at 348.
250. Id. at 353.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
254. White, 502 U.S. at 353.
255. Id. at 354 (citation omitted).
256. Id. (citation omitted).
257. Id. (citation omitted).
258. Id.
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ments would still be admissible."'
Justice Rehnquist then extended the Inadi rule to all cases where a hearsay
statement carried sufficient guarantees of reliability." Relying on the reasoning
in Inadi, he stated that "spontaneous declarations and statements made in the
course of receiving medical care ... are made in contexts that provide substan-
tial guarantees of their trustworthiness. But those same factors that contribute to
the statements' reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court
testimony.""2 1 Requiring unavailability would add nothing to the Roberts test
and would, in some cases, result in injustice. 2
Applying the Roberts test to the child's statements, Rehnquist categorized them
as spontaneous declarations and statements made for the purpose of medical diag-
nosis, both firmly rooted exceptions." Rehnquist stated that these types of state-
ments were so inherently reliable that the hearsay statements are usually more
effective than live testimony.6 4 The contexts in which the two types of hearsay
statements are made "provide substantial guarantees of trustworthiness.""26
Justice Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment."' Justice
Scalia joined him.2"7 Justice Thomas encouraged the Court to return to a more
historical reading of the Confrontation Clause, an interpretation that he reasoned
would eliminate much of the confusion surrounding the relationship between the
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay doctrine. 8
First, Thomas noted that "the Court has assumed that all hearsay declarants are
'witnesses against' a defendant within the meaning of the Clause,... an assump-
tion that is neither warranted nor supported by the history or text of the
Confrontation Clause." '269 The strictest reading would limit the right of con-
frontation "only to witnesses who actually appear and testify at trial."27 Thomas
rejected that interpretation as incompatible with the common law right of con-
frontation and the Court's precedent.271
The common law confrontation right developed "'to prevent depositions or ex
parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, [from] being
used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examina-
tion of the witness . ".'.."272 Evidentiary concerns appeared to play little role in
the development or application of the common law right of confrontation. 23 The
Court's present test, set forth in Roberts, Thomas reasoned, implied that only
unreliable hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause.274 "Reliability
259. Id. at 354-55.
260. Id. at 355-56.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 356-57.
263. Id. at 355.
264. Id. at 356.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 358.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 358-59.
269. Id. at 359 (citations omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 360.
272. Id. at 362 (citation omitted).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 363.
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is more properly a due process concern.""27 Analyzing the reliability of hearsay
statements under the Confrontation Clause "strain[ed] the text of the
Confrontation Clause to provide criminal defendants with a protection that due
process already provides them." '276
Thomas then chose a semi-historical reading of the Confrontation Clause:
"The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who
actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudi-
cial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial mate-
rials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." '277 Thomas
stated that "[s]uch an approach would be consistent with the vast majority of
[the Court's] cases, since virtually all of them decided before Ohio v. Roberts
involved prior testimony or confessions, exactly the type of formalized testimo-
nial evidence that lies at the core of the Confrontation Clause's concerns. "278
This interpretation, Thomas suggested, simplified the conflict between hearsay
and the Confrontation Clause. 9
The majority opinion greatly expanded the admissibility of hearsay statements
under the Confrontation Clause by eliminating the threshold requirement of
unavailability. The Court continued to apply the Roberts test, but it focused its
reasoning on reliability and trustworthiness. The reliability of a hearsay state-
ment contributed to both its status as a firmly rooted exception and a particularly
trustworthy statement. Two hearsay exceptions, spontaneous declarations and
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis, were also explicitly cate-
gorized as firmly rooted exceptions.
Thomas' concurrence, however, focused on the Court's continued move to
combine hearsay analysis with the Confrontation Clause.28 Thomas agreed with
the majority's result, but he found their reasoning complicated and unneces-
sary.21' By concentrating on the type of hearsay statement being offered, the
Court could more easily protect the right to confrontation.
White v. Illinois was the last case that the Court decided on Confrontation
Clause grounds before Lilly v. Virginia. Between White and Lilly, however, the
Court was confronted with another hearsay doctrine/Confrontation Clause dilem-
ma. The Court made its decision without resolving the Confrontation Clause
issue; however, in analyzing the hearsay statements in question, the Court did
take a step backwards from its controlled reading of the Confrontation Clause.
8. Williamson v. United States
282
A deputy sheriff arrested Harris during a traffic stop after the deputy discov-
275. Id. at 363-64.
276. Id. at 364.
277. Id. at 365.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 365-66.
280. Id. at 358.
281. Id.
282. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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ered nineteen kilograms of cocaine in the trunk.283 During his police interroga-
tion, Harris implicated Williamson as a leading member of the conspiracy.28 At
Williamson's trial, Harris was called to testify but he refused.28 Harris' confes-
sion, implicating Williamson, was read into the record under the against-penal-
interest hearsay exception.288 Williamson was convicted of possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute,
and travelling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine.287 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.2" Williamson asserted that the admission of Harris' confes-
sion violated his Confrontation Clause rights and Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3).289
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case.29 Justice
O'Connor delivered the Court's opinion, except for Part II-C.291 Justice
O'Connor first explored two readings of the against-penal-interest exception,
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3): 1) any non-inculpatory state-
ments render the entire statement inadmissible; and 2) any self-serving state-
ments are inadmissible, but all neutral statements, as well as self-inculpatory
statements, are admissible.292 The Court adopted the stricter reading of the rule:
[T]he most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission
of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader nar-
rative that is generally self-inculpatory. The district court may not just assume
for the purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) that a statement is self-inculpatory because it
is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement
implicates someone else.
293
Justice O'Connor also noted that the stricter reading also comported with the
Court's earlier declarations that codefendant statements were inherently unreli-
able.29 ' Harris' statement was a prime example: his statement was nothing more
than an attempt to "curry favor" with the authorities.295
By adopting this reading of Rule 804(b)(3), the Court declined to decide the
Rule's admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. 9 The Court also declined to
283. Id. at 596.
284. Id. at 597.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 597-98.
287. Id. at 597.
288. Id. at 598.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 605.
291. Id. at 596. Although Justice O'Connor authored Part II-C, only Justice Scalia joined.
292. Id. at 600-02. The Court rejected Justice Kennedy's argument that admissibility under the exception
depended on "whether a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement." Id. at 600. Justice O'Connor
reasoned that while a self-inculpatory statement is inherently more reliable than a collateral statement, the relia-
bility of a self-inculpatory statement has no bearing on the reliability of collateral statements. Id. Making
statements admissible because of their proximity to self-inculpatory statements read too much into the Rule's
ambiguous language and undermined the theory behind the Rule-that persons do not make statements that will
harm them unless those statements are true. Id.
293. Id. at 600-01.
294. Id. at 601 (citations omitted).
295. Id. at 603-04.
296. Id. at 605.
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rule on the admissibility of the exception under the particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness test articulated in Roberts.297 Justice O'Connor did articulate, how-
ever, that the strict reading of Rule 804(b)(3)-the requirement of a completely self-
inculpatory statement-was itself a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.298
Justice Scalia concurred.299 He emphasized application of the stricter reading
of the against-penal-interest exception, defining the "relevant inquiry" to be
whether the statement "so far tended to subject the declarant to ... criminal lia-
bility ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true. '300 Following the language of
the Rule necessarily excluded any collateral statements because those statements,
by definition, were not against penal interest.
301
Justice Ginsburg also filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter joined.2  She agreed with Justice O'Connor that Harris'
statements were not against his penal interest, as defined by Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3). 30 ' However, Harris' statements, even those that inculpated
him, were so self-serving as to be excluded from consideration under the against-
penal-interest exception. 4
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion as well, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined him.305 Justice Kennedy rejected the
"extreme position that no collateral statements are admissible under Rule
804(b)(3). '30 - He argued first that the Advisory Committee Notes provided for
the admission of some collateral statements: "[O]rdinarily the third-party con-
fession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused, but ... it may include
statements implicating him, and under the general theory of declarations against
interest they would be admissible as related statements. '37 Second, operating
under the assumption that Congress intended for courts to apply the principles of




300. Id. at 605-06 (citation omitted).
301. Id. at 606.
302. Id. at 607.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 608-09.
305. Id. at 611.
306. Id. at 613.
307. Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
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admissible." 8 Third, the exception would be eviscerated if collateral statements
were excluded; "the exclusion of collateral statements would cause the exclusion
of almost all inculpatory statements."309
Although Williamson did not reach the Confrontation Clause issue, the opin-
ions filed by the Court reflect a division in thinking. Justices O'Connor and
Scalia suggested that custodial confessions that also inculpated an accomplice
would fail the Roberts test. If such statements were not reliable enough to meet
the requirements of the hearsay rule, those statements certainly could not pass
the higher constitutional barrier raised by the Confrontation Clause. Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion reads the against-penal-interest exception even
more closely. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion reflected a more practical
approach to a reading of the against-penal-interest exception. By dividing a con-
fession into self-inculpatory, neutral, and self-serving statements, courts could
determine which statements were reliable enough under the exception's defini-
tion to be admissible.
The division in the Court over the reliability of the against-penal-interest
exception was the issue in Lilly v. Virginia. In Lilly, however, the Court resolved
the Confrontation Clause question it declined to address in Williamson. The
division of the Court was even stronger in Lilly than it was in Williamson, raising




On December 4, 1995, Benjamin Lilly ("Lilly"), his roommate, Gary Wayne
Barker ("Barker"), and Lilly's brother, Mark Lilly ("Lilly's brother"), embarked
on a two-day crime spree. 10 The three men met at Lilly's house, where they
consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana. 1 Some time later, the three men
drove to a friend's house. 12 When they discovered that the friend was not at
home, they broke into his home, stealing liquor, a safe, and several guns. 13 After
an unsuccessful attempt to trade the stolen guns for more marijuana, the men
drove to Blackburg, where they spent the night with a friend. 4 They drank alco-
hol and smoked marijuana all night.
31
1
The next morning, the three men tried twice more to trade the stolen guns for
marijuana.36 Their car eventually broke down near a convenience store."' After
30m. Id. at 615.
309. Id. at 616.
310. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 528 (Va. 1998). All of the evidence reviewed by the Virginia
Supreme Court was taken from Barker's testimony at trial and the statements that both Barker and Lilly's
brother made to the police after they were apprehended.
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removing the stolen guns and liquor from the car, they approached a man
inspecting his tires in the convenience store parking lot." 8 Lilly confronted the
man, Alex DeFillipis, with a gun. 19 Lilly forced DeFillipis into his own car. 2
Lilly's brother and Barker also got into the car, and the three men drove
DeFillipis to an isolated area near a river. 21 After taking DeFillipis' wallet, the
three men ordered him to get out of the car, strip down, and walk away. 22 At this
point, Lilly's brother had possession of the stolen pistol. 23 The other guns were
also in the car.324 The three men threw DeFillipis' clothes into the river and
began to leave in DeFillipis' car.32 Lilly grabbed the pistol from Lilly's brother,
ran over to DeFillipis, and shot him four times at point-blank range - three times
in the head and once in the arm.326 Lilly explained to Barker that DeFillipis
might have identified him, and he did not want to go back to the penitentiary. 27
The three men drove away, leaving the body in the middle of the road.
28
They took the money from DeFillipis' wallet and bought beer. 29 The three men
drove on, throwing "anything that might have our prints on it" into another local
river; however, they kept all of the guns, including the murder weapon.3 Shortly
thereafter, they robbed a small convenience store, taking some cash and some mer-
chandise." They proceeded on to attempt to rob another store. 2 Lilly's brother
and Barker went inside while Lilly waited in the car .3  The store's owner interrupt-
ed the robbery and pursued the men in his car until Barker fired one of the guns."
The stolen car broke down a few miles down the road.3 While the men
unloaded the guns and merchandise from the car, the police arrived.3 All three
men fled on foot, but the police soon apprehended them. 37 The three men were
taken into custody and questioned separately.
38
During the questioning, Lilly did not mention that DeFillipis had been mur-

















334. Id. at 528-29. This ends the testimony given by Barker at Lilly's trial.
335. Id. at 529.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999).
339. Id.
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beries 4" Barker and Lilly's brother, however, told the police about the murder. 41
Although their stories differed somewhat, both men pointed to Lilly as the "mas-
termind" behind both the robberies and the murder.42
Lilly was brought to trial in October 1996.3*3 Barker testified against Lilly dur-
ing the trial; Lilly's brother was also called as a witness, but he invoked his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 4 The court, however, admitted
Lilly's brother's statements to the police into evidence .3  Lilly's brother told
police in two interviews on December 6, 1995, that he had only stolen liquor in
the first robbery.3 " He also admitted that he had stolen a 12-pack during one of
the later robberies and that he had handled a gun at one point during the crime
spree.347  Additionally, he admitted to being present during all of the crimes,
including DeFillipis' murder.3 '  Lilly's brother maintained, however, that Barker
and Lilly stole the guns, that Barker had used one of the guns to hold up one of
the stores, that Lilly had "instigated" the carjacking and kidnapping of DeFillipis,
and that Lilly had shot DeFillipis without any help from Lilly's brother.
After a five-day trial, the jury convicted Lilly of capital murder and sentenced
him to death. 5 Lilly appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, citing numerous
errors, including the admission of Lilly's brother's statements to the police.5
The Virginia Supreme Court found no error and upheld both the capital murder
conviction and the death sentence.3 2  Lilly appealed this decision to the United
States Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari3 3 to consider whether the




343. Lilly, 499 S.E.2d at 528.
344. Id. at 528, 533.
345. Id. at 533.
346. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1892. Mark was interrogated from 1:35 AM to 2:12 AM, and from 2:32 AM to 2:53




350. 499 S.E.2d at 527-28. He was also convicted of several lesser included offenses and several firearms
violations. For these lesser offense convictions, Lilly received two life sentences plus 27 years. Id. at 528.
351. Id. at 529. Among the issues that Lilly cited as error were 1) the trial court's failure to allow Lilly to
exceed the scope of pre-approved voir dire issues with the potential jurors, 2) the trial court's failure to allow
Lilly to educate the jurors on parole and life sentences in capital murder cases, 3) the trial court's dismissal for
cause of six jurors, 4) the trial court's failure to dismiss three more jurors for cause, 5) the trial court's denial of
Lilly's motion for change of venue, 6) the trial court's denial of Lilly's motion for mistrial after the
Commonwealth showed graphic photographs and video tape of the murder scene, 7) the trial court's failure to
exclude Lilly's incriminating pre-custodial statements to one of the arresting police officers, 8) the trial court's
admission of police testimony that Lilly refused to take a gunpowder residue test and that Lilly rubbed his
hands together to destroy any evidence of gunpowder residue, 9) the trial court's admission of forensic evi-
dence that Lilly asserted was inconsistent with the Commonwealth's theory, 10) the trial court's admission of a
medical examiner's report that contained tests and test results not performed by the doctor who performed the
autopsy, 11) the trial court's failure to sequester witnesses, particularly Barker, 12) the trial court's failure to
allow jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, and 13) the trial court's failure to declare a mistrial for prose-
cutorial misconduct. Id. at 529-37. The United States Supreme Court did not address any of these issues in its
hearing of the case.
352. Id. at 537.
353. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999).
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dence at his trial a nontestifying accomplice's entire confession that contained
some statements against the accomplice's penal interest and others that inculpat-
ed the accused.
354
B. The Supreme Court ' Opinion
The Supreme Court unanimously voted to reverse the decision of the Virginia
Supreme Court.55 The Court held that the admission of Lilly's brother's state-
ments to the police violated Lilly's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.5 8
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Virginia Supreme Court for a deter-
mination of harmless error.5 7
The precise reasoning behind the Court's decision, however, was not unani-
mous. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, a plurality opinion, in
which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined him.3M Justice Breyer also
filed a concurring opinion.5 9 Justices Scalia and Thomas both filed opinions,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.36 Chief Justice Rehnquist
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment; Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
joined him." 1
1. Justice Stevens' Opinion
In Part I of his opinion, Justice Stevens reviewed the pertinent facts of the case,
including the procedural history.3"2 He also discussed the reasoning of the
Virginia Supreme Court in upholding Lilly's conviction.3 3 The Virginia Supreme
Court found that under White v. Illinois,"6 4 the Virginia hearsay exception that
allows statements against penal interest had "sufficient guarantees of reliability to
come within a firmly rooted exception" and satisfied the Confrontation Clause.365
Certiorari was granted to review the Confrontation Clause.366
In Part II, Justice Stevens established the Court's jurisdiction. 37  The
Commonwealth argued that Lilly had not preserved his Sixth Amendment argu-
ment, because he had not presented it to the Virginia Supreme Court.36  The
Court found jurisdiction for three reasons: 1) in his opening statement to the
Virginia Supreme Court, Lilly expressed that admission of Lilly's brother's state-
354. Id. at 1892.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1901.
357. Id. at 1900.
358. Id. at 1892. Specifically, Justice Stevens' six-part opinion was joined as follows: Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas joined Parts I and VI. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Scalia
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ments violated his right to confrontation; 2) Lilly cited both Lee v. Illinois38 and
Williamson v. United States37 in his reply brief to the Virginia Supreme Court;
and 3) the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the issue. 71
Justice Stevens began the Court's analysis of the Confrontation Clause in Part
111.1" The main purpose of the Confrontation Clause, he stated, is "to ensure the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigor-
ous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." '373
Without the right to cross-examination, a criminal defendant loses the opportuni-
ty to test the declarant's statement for its truth. 7 ' Stevens referred to the Court's
most recent Confrontation Clause case, White v. Illinois,"' and noted that the
Confrontation Clause would not be narrowly construed. 76 Instead, the two-part
test established in Ohio v. Roberts377 was the proper test to interpret the
Confrontation Clause. 78 In Roberts, the Court determined that the Confrontation
Clause was not violated by admission of a hearsay statement if 1) "'the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception' or 2) it contains 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness' such that adversarial testing would be expected to
add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability." '379
Part IV analyzed Lilly's brother's statements under the Roberts test." ° Justice
Stevens began this analysis with an examination of the history of both the firmly
rooted exception doctrine and the statement against penal interest exception381
Firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule have been allowed as evidence since
1895 in Mattox v. United States.82 According to Mattox, the Framers must have
intended to "'respec[t]' certain unquestionable rules of evidence in drafting the
Confrontation Clause." '383 A hearsay statement falls within a firmly rooted
exception when "it 'rest[s] [on] such [a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of vir-
tually any evidence within [it] comports with the 'substance of the constitutional
protection."' 384 This "solid foundation" is established by time. 88
Turning to the declaration against penal interest exception, Justice Stevens
noted that the exception has three different meanings: 1) its use as a voluntary
admission against a declarant; 2) its use as exculpatory evidence offered by a
369. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
370. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
371. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1893.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1894 (citation omitted).
374. Id
375. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
376. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894 (citation omitted).
377. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
378. Lilly, S. Ct. at 1894 (citation omitted).
379. Id. (citation omitted).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
383. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894 (citation omitted).
384. Id. at 1895 (citations omitted).
385. Id. The Court refers to spontaneous declarations as an example of a "firmly rooted" exception. Id. The
spontaneous declarations exception is over two centuries old and is currently widely accepted as a trustworthy
exception. Id.
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defendant; and 3) its use as evidence to establish the guilt of an accomplice." 6
He reviewed the admissibility of the first two applications of the exception, rely-
ing on the Court's precedent.38 ' He determined, however, that the third applica-
tion of the exception, to prove the guilt of an accomplice, applied to the present
case. 8 Stevens discussed the use of the against-penal-interest exception to prove
the guilt of an accomplice as one of "recent vintage," similar in function to state-
ments used in the "ancient ex parte affidavit system," and "inherently unreli-
able. '389 He focused his analysis on the "inherently unreliable" nature of the
exception under the Roberts test. 9
In Crawford v. United States,391 the Court stated that "even when an alleged
accomplice testifies, his confession that 'incriminate[s] himself together with
defendant .. .ought to be received with suspicion ...."'392 Accordingly, the
same reasoning was applied to the Sixth Amendment in Douglas v. Alabama,
when the Court ruled that "the admission of a nontestifying accomplice's confes-
sion, which shifted responsibility and implicated the defendant . . . 'plainly
denied [the defendant] the right of cross-examination secured by the
Confrontation Clause." 39 3 This principle was reaffirmed in Lee v. Illinois.94
Stevens also emphasized the Court's continuity of reasoning in applying this
principle to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 Williamson reached the same
result-the exclusion of an accomplice's statement that shifted blame-without
even addressing the Confrontation Clause issue."' It followed naturally then,
Stevens reasoned, that "accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal
defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that
concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
397
Stevens continued his application of the Roberts test, holding that the declara-
tion-against-penal-interest exception also violated the particular guarantees of
trustworthiness test.398 He reemphasized the unreliability of accomplice confes-
sions and the low probability that such a heavy presumption of unreliability
could be rebutted.399 He also noted that the Roberts test required independent
guarantees of trustworthiness. ' Corroborating evidence, such as the Miranda
warnings administered to Lilly's brother, admissibility in state court, and Lilly's
brother's knowledge of his own criminal liability, could not be used to increase
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1895-97. Voluntary admissions were routinely offered into evidence against the person who made
the statement. When the statement is admitted in a joint trial, however, great care is taken in admitting the
statement. Statements used as exculpatory statements are admissible under the Due Process Clause when the
statement is sufficiently reliable. Because the statement is exculpatory rather than inculpatory, however, the
Confrontation Clause is not implicated.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1897.
390. Id.
391. 212 U.S. 183 (1909).
392. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1897 (emphasis added).
393. Id. (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
394. Id. (citation omitted).
395. Id. at 1898 (citation omitted).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1899.
398. Id. at 1900-01.
399. Id. at 1900.
400. Id.
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the trustworthiness of the hearsay statements.' 1
Part VI reversed the conviction.' 2 The case was remanded to the trial court. 3
Stevens declared that even though admission of Lilly's brother's confession vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause, the trial court could still find the error harmless
and uphold the conviction.' 40'
2. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Breyer agreed that the accomplice confession should be
excluded, he disapproved of the plurality's application of the Confrontation
Clause.' ° A hearsay-based approach to the Confrontation Clause, Breyer stated,
was a recent application of the defendant's right to confront his accusers.' 6 The
current reading of the Confrontation Clause, Breyer argued, was "both too nar-
row and too broad.'
'40 7
Breyer argued that the hearsay-based approach was too narrow, in that it pro-
duced inconsistent results." 8 A piece of evidence may fall under more than one
hearsay exception. 9 "For example, a deposition or videotaped confession
sometimes could fall within the exception for vicarious admissions or, . . . the
exception for statements against penal interest."' 10 Depending on which excep-
tion was argued to the court, the statement would either be admitted under a
firmly rooted exception, or it would be excluded as lacking particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness. 11
The Confrontation Clause was defined too broadly, on the other hand, in that it
called all hearsay into question. 2 The Roberts test required all hearsay to be con-
sidered, whether it falls under a hearsay exception or not. 3 Even a hearsay state-
ment that would be excluded under the hearsay doctrine could be admissible as a
hearsay statement with particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' 1 ' Justice
Breyer concluded by stating that the Court "need not reexamine the current connec-
tion between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule... because the state-
ments at issue violate the Clause regardless.""' The link between the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay doctrine was a "question open for another day."'1 6
3. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia viewed the introduction of Lilly's brother's taped confession




405. Id. at 1902.
406. Id. Justice Breyer notes that confrontation is mentioned in the Bible and Shakespearean works, as well
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without giving Lilly the opportunity to cross-examine Lilly's brother as "a para-
digmatic Confrontation Clause violation."417 He referred to the portion of the
White v. Illinois concurrence written by Justice Thomas, which advocated a his-
torical reading of the Confrontation Clause."18 Under a historical view, violations
would be limited to that evidence which was "'contained in formalized testimo-
nial material."' 19 Scalia concluded his concurrence by joining in Parts I, II, and
VI of the plurality opinion.'
4. Justice Thomas' Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas joined Parts I and VI of the plurality opinion. 1 He reiterated
his view that "the Confrontation Clause 'extends to any witness who actually
testifies at trial' and 'is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as
they are contained in formalized testimonial material, such as affidavits, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, or confessions."'422 He also agreed with Chief Justice
Rehnquist that a "blanket ban on the government's use of accomplice statements
that incriminate a defendant" did not comport with "an original understanding of
the Confrontation Clause." '423 Furthermore, a per se inadmissibility rule prevent-
ed judicial review.4
5. Justice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion. 25 Rehnquist
strongly opposed the plurality's per se rule that accomplice confessions that incul-
pated a defendant did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 8
Imposing such a rigid rule was unnecessary in this case, because the hearsay state-
ments were not even admissible under the against-penal-interest exception, much
less under the heightened standard of the Confrontation Clause. 7
Furthermore, Rehnquist argued, the plurality misapplied the Roberts test.4 8
Lilly's brother's statements should be viewed suspiciously because his confes-
sion was custodial. 9 In its precedent, the Court consistently viewed custodial
confessions with suspicion without ever focusing on what hearsay exceptions
applied to these confessions." The Court's blanket ban would now prevent non-
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. (citation omitted)
420. Id. Part I reviewed the facts, Part 1I defined the Court's jurisdiction over the case, and Part VI held that
the statements violated the Confrontation Clause, reversed Lilly's conviction, and remanded the case to the trial
court for a ruling on harmless error.
421. Id




426. Id. at 1904.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 1905.
429. Id.
430. Id. (citations omitted).
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custodial accomplice statements that inculpated a defendant from ever being
admitted, even though such statements carried particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness.
31
Rehnquist also implied that even a custodial confession could carry particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness if the confession was considered as more than
one statement. 32 The statements that inculpated Lilly and the statements that
inculpated Lilly's brother were made at different intervals in the hour-long inter-
view."33 Rehnquist tentatively suggested that the neutral statements and the
inculpatory statements could be separated and those statements with particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness could be used at trial without violating the
Confrontation Clause. 34
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Court reached a unanimous decision in Lilly v. Virginia, the
Justices reached their respective decisions through three different arguments.
Those three arguments apply a hearsay analysis to the Confrontation Clause in
varying degrees. First, the Ohio v. Roberts analysis focuses entirely on a hearsay-
based approach. Second, the Case-by-Case Adjudication approach focuses on a
hearsay-based approach, but by emphasizing trustworthiness and reliability out-
side defined hearsay exceptions, this analysis concentrates on common sense reli-
ability. This practical approach more closely resembles the goal of the
Confrontation Clause, to protect the accused from being convicted on unreliable
evidence. Third, the Historical Approach nearly abandons a hearsay approach
and returns to a more procedural approach to the Confrontation Clause. 3'
A. THE OHio V. ROBERTS ANALYSIS
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion, in which he was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, holds strongly to the two-part test set forth in Ohio
v. Roberts . 3' The plurality opinion firmly rejected the against-penal-interest
exception as firmly rooted, stating that "accomplices' confessions that inculpate
a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule




The plurality opinion addressed the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
test, but Justice Stevens reasoned that the unreliability of a hearsay statement is
431. Id. Rehnquist briefly discussed Dutton v. Evans, pointing out that a noncustodial accomplice statement
that inculpated the defendant was admitted within the confines of the Confrontation Clause because it had indi-
cia of reliability. In Dutton, the accomplice made statements incriminating the defendant to his cellmate; the
cellmate testified to those statements at the trial. Id. Rehnquist also noted several Courts of Appeals cases that
admitted noncustodial accomplice statements against a defendant. Id. at n.3.
432. Id. at 1904.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. I have named the three approaches according to their most obvious characteristics. I specifically chose
not to name the approaches after their staunchest supporters in case one of the Justices should later alter his rea-
soning.
436. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
437. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1899 (1999).
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best rebutted by a long history of admitting similar statements.' 8 The plurality,
then, effectively created a per se inadmissibility rule for accomplice statements
that inculpate a defendant.
The Roberts test has been applied in every Supreme Court case involving the
Confrontation Clause since the test was established in 1980. However, subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions have altered and clarified the Roberts analysis,
changing it slightly. These changes represent the first of the three Confrontation
Clause interpretations within the Court.
Beginning with Lee v. Illinois, '39 two different arguments began to emerge.
These arguments include 1) adopting a per se admissibility rule for hearsay
exceptions under the Roberts test; and 2) adopting a case-by-case analysis with-
out applying per se admissibility rules. Justices who firmly adhered to the
Roberts test have chosen to adopt per se admissibility rules.
In White v. Illinois,"4 ' for example, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted a
per se admissibility rule for both spontaneous declarations and statements made
for the purpose of medical diagnosis because these two hearsay exceptions have
substantial guarantees of trustworthiness and are firmly rooted exceptions.4 "
Conversely, the majority opinion in Lee v. Illinois"' effectively created a per se
inadmissible rule for codefendant confessions by establishing a high presump-
tion that such statements were unreliable. Finally, in Lilly v. Virginia," 3 the plu-
rality essentially held that accomplice confessions which inculpate a defendant
were per se inadmissible."
As a result of these per se rulings, the Roberts adherents have shifted their focus
to the first part of the Roberts test: the firmly rooted exception. In Lee, when the
majority determined that codefendant confessions did not fall within a firmly
rooted exception, they placed an extremely high presumption of unreliability on
codefendant confessions. " ' Similarly, in Idaho v. Wright,"46 the Court rejected
statements that were admitted under the state's residual hearsay exception. "7 The
majority adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test to evaluate the statement's
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness but limited the circumstances to inde-
pendent factors; corroborating evidence could not be considered to determine a
statement's trustworthiness." 8 Eliminating corroborating evidence raised the pre-
sumption of unreliability for hearsay statements even higher.
White v. Illinois4.9 created a per se admissibility rule for spontaneous declara-
tions and statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis under the
Confrontation Clause because those exceptions were firmly rooted. In fact, the
Court considered those types of statements even more reliable than live testimo-
ny because of the contexts in which such statements are made. Again, the Court
438. Id. at 1900 (citation omitted).
439. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
440. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
441. Id. at 355-56.
442. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
443. 119S. Ct. 1887(1999).
444. Id. at 1899.
445. Lee, 476 U.S. at 543-44.
446. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
447. Id. at 817.
448. Id. at 820-21.
449. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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focused on the firmly rooted exception part of the Roberts test.
By adopting per se rules and focusing on the firmly rooted exception prong of
the two-part test, the Roberts test evaluates Confrontation Clause issues through
a hearsay-based approach. Analyses under the Roberts test no longer focus on
constitutional safeguards; the only question is whether the hearsay is reliable
enough to be admitted without cross-examination. If cross-examination cannot
increase the reliability of a hearsay statement, it is compatible with the
Confrontation Clause, and only firmly rooted exceptions have proven that cross-
examination cannot increase their reliability. The likelihood of a hearsay state-
ment being admitted because it bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
is very slight. The exception would have to carry those guarantees independent
of any other evidence. 5'
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg may be called firm adherents to the
Roberts approach. Justice Stevens was a member of the Court that established
the Roberts test, and he participated in both the Wright and Lilly opinions that
adopted per se inadmissibility approaches to hearsay exceptions and focused on
the firmly rooted exception prong to the Roberts test. Both Justices Stevens and
Souter participated in the White opinion adopting a per se admissibility standard.
Lilly v. Virginia"" was the first Confrontation Clause case in which Justice
Ginsburg participated. However, she filed a concurrence in Williamson v. United
States4"2 in which Justices Stevens and Souter joined, and which comports with
the Roberts approach. In Williamson, Justice Ginsburg rejected the idea that
Harris' statements fell within a hearsay exception." 3 She did, however, approve
the majority's close reading of the against-penal-interest exception.5 4 Ginsburg
adopted both a strict reading and a strict interpretation of the against-penal-inter-
est hearsay exception for admissibility at trial. Because her approach to hearsay
exceptions is so strict, requiring great reliability, the Roberts approach to
Confrontation Clause issues best suits her reasoning. The Ohio v. Roberts analy-
sis' focus on firmly rooted exceptions comports with Justice Ginsburg's reason-
ing in Williamson.
Although Justice Breyer joined in the plurality opinion, he cannot be consid-
ered an adherent of the Ohio v. Roberts approach. His concurring opinion in
Lilly focuses on the history of the Confrontation Clause, and he appears unsure
that the Roberts test is appropriate for analyzing Confrontation Clause/hearsay
doctrine issues. Although he participated in the plurality opinion, his concur-
rence appears to follow the historical approach. Lilly was his first Confrontation
Clause case, however, so his vote cannot be firmly categorized.
Justice O'Connor, however, is most likely an adherent to the Ohio v. Roberts
approach. In Lilly she joined Justice Rehnquist's concurrence. Justice
O'Connor overwhelmingly relies on the firmly rooted exception approach to
450. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). n. 229-35, supra.
451. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
452. Id. at 608.
453. Id. See n. 230-31, supra.
454. Id. at 606-07.
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Confrontation Clause analysis.
Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion in Lee v. Illinois, which encour-
aged a per se inadmissibility rule for codefendant confessions."' She authored
the majority opinion in Idaho v. Wright, which adopted a per se inadmissibility
rule for residual hearsay exceptions and eliminating-corroborating evidence as a
factor in determining particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,4"' She also
delivered the Court's opinion in Williamson v. United States, which adopted a
strict reading of the against-penal-interest hearsay exception." 7
Overall, the Ohio v. Roberts approach allows only reliable hearsay statements
to comply with the Confrontation Clause. The focus on the firmly rooted excep-
tion prong provides a stronger line of reasoning for lower courts to follow, which
would create uniformity in Confrontation Clause decisions. However, the great
presumption of unreliability that the Ohio v. Roberts approach places on hearsay
statements that do not fall within a firmly rooted exception could result in guilty
defendants being acquitted.
B. Case-by-Case Adjudication
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Lilly, joined by Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor rejected the Roberts approach. Instead of adopting a per
se inadmissibility rule, Rehnquist argued for a case-by-case consideration of the
statements' particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Rehnquist rejected the
plurality's statement that all accomplice statements that inculpate a defendant do
not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception under Roberts. He argued that
the blanket ban on accomplice statements would eliminate some accomplice
statements that did carry particularized guarantees of trustworthiness; the empha-
sis, he stated, should be placed on the particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, not on the firmly rooted exception test.45
Rehnquist has consistently adopted a case-by-case approach to Confrontation
Clause/hearsay doctrine issues. In Lee v. Illinois, Rehnquist joined Justice
Blackmun in dissenting from the majority's holding that the codefendant's con-
fession was unreliable.5 9 The dissent classified the confession as against-penal-
interest, a "firmly established" hearsay exception."' Even as a codefendant con-
fession, though, the totality of the circumstances produced sufficient indicia of
reliability.61 The corroborating evidence carried a great weight in establishing
indicia of reliability.
462
The case-by-case adjudication approach advocates the use of corroborating
evidence in finding a hearsay statement reliable. Justice Kennedy, in Idaho v.
455. Lee, 476 U.S. 530, 540-42 (1986).
456. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 819-21 (1990).
457. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994). See also Part II, section 8, supra, regarding
the discussion of Justice Ginsburg's similar reading of the Rule and its meaning under the Ohio v. Roberts
approach.
458. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1904-06 (1999).
459. Lee, 476 U.S. 530, 551 (1986).
460. Id.
461. Id. at 552-54.
462. Id.
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Wright, dissented from the majority opinion, which required a hearsay statement
to be independently reliable." 3 Rehnquist joined his dissenting opinion." 4
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Wright summarized the case-by-case
adjudication approach. Kennedy repeatedly emphasized common sense and
practicality in determining whether a statement bore particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."' Additionally, Kennedy argued that the Court had relied on
corroborating evidence in past Confrontation Clause cases. "
The Case-by-Case Adjudication approach applies the Roberts test, but it
applies the test in a practical and realistic manner. This analysis employs a true
"totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether a hearsay statement
contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness rather than focusing on the
firmly rooted exception prong of the Roberts test. The resulting interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause is still hearsay-based, in that Roberts is still applied.
The use of corroborating evidence approved by the Case-by-Case Adjudication
approach, however, is both a hearsay-based concern and a constitutional safe-
guard. Reliability of the evidence necessarily increases with the amount of evi-
dence that corroborates that statement, and the reliability of evidence is a prima-
ry goal of both the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay doctrine. Both Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy have consistently followed this approach
and can be considered adherents of the Case-by-Case Adjudication approach.
Overall, the focus on particularized guarantees of trustworthiness expands the
number of hearsay statements that are compatible with the Confrontation Clause.
The Case-by-Case Adjudication approach, however, creates a lack of uniformity
for lower court decisions involving those hearsay statements that do not fall
within a firmly rooted exception. The ability of lower courts to rely on corrobo-
rating evidence, though, would serve to correct part of that lack of uniformity.
The use of corroborative evidence would allow the lower courts to make more
informed rulings and would simplify judicial review.
C. The Historical Approach
In Lilly, Justices Thomas and Scalia suggest in their concurring opinions that
the Roberts test be abandoned.'67 This can be done by limiting the application of
the Confrontation Clause to "any witness who actually testifies at trial""' and
"extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testi-
monial material, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions."' 66 As a result the Confrontation Clause will once again perform as
463. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990).
464. Id.
465. Id at 828, 831-34.
466. Id. at 831-32 (citations omitted).
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the Framers intended.
Thomas introduced this historical approach in White v. Illinois."' In his con-
curring opinion, Thomas reanalyzed the connection between hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause and concluded that, over time, the Court had unnecessarily
confused the two doctrines." 1 The problem, Thomas reasoned, began with the
Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's language; the assumption that
hearsay declarants constituted witnesses against an accused was unwarranted and
unsupported." 2 Thomas suggested that the Sixth Amendment was drafted to
avoid the abusive practices of sixteenth and seventeenth-century English courts;
defendants were often convicted on the basis of affidavits, letters, depositions,
and accomplice confessions." 3 The Roberts test, however, "implie[d] that the
Confrontation Clause bar[red] only unreliable hearsay." 44 Reliability was not a
hearsay issue, but a due process concern."7
Justice Breyer also suggests a historical approach to Confrontation Clause
analysis in Lilly, but he does not explicitly adopt it,478 as Justices Scalia and
Thomas have. Breyer simply suggests that Roberts' firmly rooted exception test
does not amply protect criminal defendants and that Roberts' particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness test complicates Confrontation Clause analysis.
477
Breyer questions whether the Confrontation Clause is a question of fact, evaluat-
ing "trustworthiness," or a procedural right that helps assure "trustworthiness." '478
Despite all his speculations, however, Breyer "leave[s] the question open for
another day." '479
The Historical Approach, then, gives the defendant the right to cross-examine
the witnesses who testify at trial and the right to cross-examine the person who
makes any formalized statement to be introduced at the trial. The admissibility
of any other hearsay statement will be determined by the current rules of evi-
dence and will not bear on the Confrontation Clause. Ultimately, the Historical
Approach has attracted only two Justices: Scalia and Thomas.
D. Interaction Among the Three Approaches
Since the Historical Approach is the newest argument concerning
Confrontation Clause/hearsay doctrine issues, a brief look at how prior cases
470. 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992).
471. Id.
472. Id. at 359.
473. Idat 361. Thomas particularly refers to Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason. The Crown's best evi-
dence was an alleged co-conspirator's repudiated confession. Id.
474. Id. at 363-64.
475. Id. Both Justice Harlan and Professor Wigmore consistently argued that admission of hearsay statements
was a due process concern. Id. at 359-60 (citing 5 J Wigmore, Evidence § 1364 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974) and
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95 (1970)).
476. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1901-03 (1999).
477. Id. at 1902-03.
478. Id. at 1903 (citations omitted).
479. Id.
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would have been affected will prove helpful. Of the Court's previous
Confrontation Clause cases, only Idaho v. Wright"0 would have been decided
differently. Under the Historical Approach, the child's statements to her doctor
were not formalized testimonial materials. Whether the child's statements were
trustworthy would have depended upon the rules of evidence, not the constitu-
tional right to confrontation.
The Ohio v. Roberts approach is incompatible with the Case-by-Case
Adjudication approach. Rehnquist and Kennedy are constantly fighting per se
inadmissibility of hearsay exceptions under the Ohio v. Roberts approach. The
differences between the two approaches are fundamental and will not likely be
resolved as long as Roberts is applied to Confrontation Clause cases.
The Case-by-Case Adjudication approach and the Historical Approach are
more compatible. Justice Rehnquist has repeatedly focused his arguments on the
circumstances surrounding the hearsay statements as determinative of their com-
patibility with the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, in Lilly, Rehnquist point-
ed out that the unreliability of the statement was due to the fact that it was a cus-
todial confession, not that it was a statement against penal interest.481 Under the
Historical Approach, custodial confessions are formalized testimonial state-
ments, inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.
The Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Historical Approach conflict because
Case-by-Case Adjudication will not always exclude formalized testimonial mate-
rials. When such statements bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
under Roberts, the statement is considered compatible with the Confrontation
Clause. In Lee v. Illinois, Rehnquist argued that the codefendant confession had
sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted under the Confrontation Clause. 2
Under the Case-by-Case Adjudication approach, that particular codefendant con-
fession would have been admitted under the Confrontation Clause. The
Historical Approach would have automatically rejected it as incompatible with
the Confrontation Clause.
The Historical Approach and the Ohio v. Roberts approach are completely
incompatible. The Historical Approach's procedural view of the Confrontation
Clause directly conflicts with the evidentiary standard approach that the Roberts
test has introduced. The factual analysis of the Ohio v. Roberts approach is irrec-
oncilable with the legal standard analysis of the Historical Approach. The
Historical Approach protects criminal defendants to a much higher degree than
the Ohio v. Roberts approach.
After the Court's decision in Lilly, the three-way split is fairly even. If Justice
Breyer adopts the Historical Approach, the outcome of future cases may change.
With three adherents to the Historical Approach and two adherents to the Case-by-
Case Adjudication approach, the next Confrontation Clause case may not apply the
Ohio v. Roberts approach. The outcome will depend upon the type of statement at
480. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). For a discussion of the facts in Lilly v. Virginia, see Part III, A, supra.
481. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1905 (1999). See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), and
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
482. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
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issue-a noncustodial statement or a nontestimonial statement that does not fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception could result in that statement's admissi-
bility under the Confrontation Clause. Adherents to the Ohio v. Roberts approach
are not likely to agree with such a ruling because of the heavy presumption of
unreliability the Ohio v. Roberts approach places on such statements. If Justice
Breyer adopts the Ohio v. Roberts approach, however, that approach will remain
the majority rule in Confrontation Clause/hearsay doctrine cases. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and O'Connor have fairly strongly adhered to the Roberts test.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is currently split three ways in analyzing Confrontation
Clause/hearsay doctrine issues. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg strictly
adhere to the Ohio v. Roberts approach, which focuses on per se admissibility
rules and the firmly rooted exception of the Roberts test. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy prefer a Case-by-Case Adjudication approach,
which applies the Roberts test in a more practical fashion by relying on the par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Justices Scalia and Thomas have
advocated a Historical Approach, which would abandon the Roberts test com-
pletely and provide criminal defendants with the right to cross-examine only trial
witnesses and declarants of formalized testimonial materials.
Until Lilly v. Virginia, Justice O'Connor appeared to be a strict adherent of the
Ohio v. Roberts approach. Her participation in Rehnquist's concurrence raises a
question as to whether she is leaning toward the Case-by-Case Adjudication
approach. The overwhelming majority of her votes, however, have followed the
Ohio v. Roberts approach, and she will most likely continue to follow the Roberts
test.
Justice Breyer wavers between the Ohio v. Roberts approach and the Historical
Approach. Although the Roberts test appears firmly rooted in the Court's
Confrontation Clause analysis, Breyer implies that Roberts may not be the best
analysis to use. Any future change in the Court's Confrontation Clause deci-
sions, then, depends on Justice Breyer's choosing the Historical Approach.
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